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Abstract
With recent developments of wireless communication technologies, malicious users can use them
to commit crimes or launch terror attacks, thus imposing new threats on the public security. To quickly
respond to defend these attacks, authorized parities (e.g., the National Security Agency of the USA) need
to intervene in the malicious communication links over the air. This paper investigates this emerging
wireless communication intervention problem at the physical layer. Unlike prior studies using jamming
to disrupt or disable the targeted wireless communications, we propose a new physical-layer spoofing
approach to change their communicated information. Consider a fundamental three-node system over
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, in which an intermediary legitimate spoofer aims
to spoof a malicious communication link from Alice to Bob, such that the received message at Bob
is changed from Alice’s originally sent message to the one desired by the spoofer. We propose a
new symbol-level spoofing scheme, where the spoofer designs the spoofing signal via exploiting the
symbol-level relationship between each original constellation point of Alice and the desirable one of
the spoofer. In particular, the spoofer aims to minimize the average spoofing-symbol-error-rate (SSER),
which is defined as the average probability that the symbols decoded by Bob fail to be changed or
spoofed, by designing its spoofing signals over symbols subject to the average transmit power constraint.
By considering two cases when Alice employs the widely-used binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) and
quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK) modulations, we obtain the respective optimal solutions to the two
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2average SSER minimization problems. Numerical results show that the symbol-level spoofing scheme
with optimized transmission achieves a much lower average SSER, as compared to other benchmark
schemes.
Index Terms
Wireless communication surveillance and intervention, symbol-level spoofing, spoofing-symbol-
error-rate (SSER) minimization, power control.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent technological advancements have enabled increasing use of infrastructure-free wireless
communications. For example, smartphone users can exchange information with each other by
exploiting local Wi-Fi and Bluetooth connections, or using the fifth-generation (5G) cellular
device-to-device communications; and even unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can directly com-
municate with nearby ground stations and send back photos and videos in real time. Although
these infrastructure-free communication links bring great convenience to our daily lives, they can
also be used by malicious users to launch various security attacks. For instance, terrorists can use
peer-to-peer Wi-Fi connections to communicate and facilitate terror attacks, and criminals can
control UAVs to spy and collect private information from rightful users. As such malicious attacks
are launched via infrastructure-free wireless communications, they are difficult to be monitored
by solely using existing information surveillance methods that intercept the communication data
at the cellular or Internet infrastructures.1 In response to such new threats on public security,
authorized parties such as government agencies should develop new approaches to legitimately
surveil these suspicious wireless communication links over the air (e.g., via eavesdropping) to
detect malicious attacks, and then intervene in them (e.g., via jamming and spoofing) to quickly
defend and disable these attacks.
There have been several recent studies in the literature that investigate the surveillance of
wireless communications, where authorized parties efficiently intercept suspicious wireless com-
munication links, extract their exchanged data contents, and help identify the malicious wireless
communication links to intervene in. Conventionally, the methods for wireless communications
1See, e.g., the Terrorist Surveillance Program launched by the National Security Agency in the USA at
https://nsa.gov1.info/surveillance/.
3surveillance include wiretapping of wireless operators’ infrastructures and installation of mon-
itoring software in smartphones. Recently, over-the-air eavesdropping has emerged as a new
wireless communications surveillance method. Among others, passive eavesdropping (see, e.g.,
[2]) and proactive eavesdropping [3]–[6] are two approaches implemented at the physical layer,
in which authorized parties can deploy dedicated wireless monitors to overhear the targeted
wireless communications, especially the infrastructure-free ones.
Efficient surveillance can help detect and identify malicious users and their communications.
After that, authorized parties need to quickly respond and defend them via wireless communica-
tion intervention. For example, the security agency may need to disrupt, disable, or spoof ongoing
terrorists’ communications to prevent terror attacks at the planning stage, and it is also desirable
to change the control signal of a malicious UAV to land it in a targeted location and catch it.
In the literature, physical-layer jamming (see, e.g., [7]–[14]) is one existing approach that can
be employed to intervene in malicious communications, though it was originally proposed for
military instead of public security applications. In the physical-layer jamming, the jammer sends
artificially generated Gaussian noise (so-called “uncorrelated jamming” [7]–[11]) or a processed
version of the malicious signal (so-called “correlated jamming” [12]–[14]) to disrupt or disable
the targeted malicious wireless communications. However, jamming the targeted communications
at the physical layer is easy to be detected, and may not be sufficient to successfully intervene in
malicious activities. This is due to the fact that when the targeted communication continuously
fails due to the jamming attack, the malicious users may take counter-measures by changing
their communication frequency bands or switching to another way of communications. Thus, we
are motivated to study a new wireless communication intervention via spoofing at the physical
layer, which can keep the malicious communication but change the communicated information
to intervene in.
We investigate the new physical-layer spoofing by considering a fundamental three-node sys-
tem over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels. As shown in Fig. 1, an intermediary
legitimate spoofer aims to spoof a malicious communication link from Alice to Bob, such that
the received message at Bob is changed from Alice’s originally sent message to the one desired
by the spoofer. Under this setup, we propose a new symbol-level spoofing approach, in which
the spoofer designs the spoofing signals via exploiting the symbol-level relationship between
each original constellation point of Alice and the desirable one of the spoofer, so as to optimize
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Fig. 1. The system model with a spoofer aiming to purposely change the information content transmitted from Alice to Bob.
the spoofing performance. In particular, we consider two cases when Alice employs the widely-
used binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) and quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK) modulations,
respectively.2 The objective of the spoofer is to minimize the average spoofing-symbol-error-rate
(SSER), i.e., the average probability that the symbols decoded by Bob fail to be changed as the
desirable ones of the spoofer. The main results of this paper are summarized as follows.
• In the BPSK case (with the constellation points being ±1), the spoofing signals are designed
by classifying the symbols into two types. In each of Type-I symbols (see Fig. 2-(a)), where
the original constellation point of Alice and the desirable one of the spoofer are identical
(both are +1 or −1), the spoofing signal is designed to constructively combine with the
original signal of Alice at Bob to help improve the decoding reliability against Gaussian
noise. In each of Type-II symbols (see Fig. 2-(b)), where the original constellation point of
Alice and the desirable one of the spoofer are opposite (one is +1 (or −1) but the other
is −1 (or +1)), the spoofing signal is designed to destructively combine with the original
signal of Alice at Bob, thus moving the constellation point towards the desirable opposite
direction. We minimize the average SSER by optimizing the spoofing signals and their power
allocations over Type-I and Type-II symbols at the spoofer, subject to its average transmit
power constraint. Although this problem is non-convex, we derive its optimal solution. It
is shown that when the transmit power at Alice is low or the spoofing power at the spoofer
is high, the spoofer should allocate its transmit power to both Type-I and Type-II symbols.
2Note that the symbol-level spoofing approach is extendible to other modulation techniques such as M -ary quadrature amplitude
modulation (M -QAM) and M -ary phase shift keying (M -PSK) with M > 4. Nevertheless, under these modulation techniques,
how to design spoofing signals to optimally solve the average SSER minimization problem is generally a more difficult task,
since the corresponding SSER functions will become very complicated.
5Otherwise, when the transmit power at Alice is high and the spoofing power at the spoofer
is low, the spoofer should allocate almost all its transmit power over a certain percentage
of Type-II symbols with an “on-off” power control.
• In the QPSK case with the constellation points being (±1 ± j)/√2 with j = √−1, the
symbols are further classified into three types, where in Type-I, Type-II, and Type-III
symbols, the original constellation points of Alice and the desirable ones of the spoofer
are identical, opposite, and neighboring, respectively, as shown in Fig. 5. For Type-I and
Type-II symbols, the spoofing signals are designed to have equal strengths for the real and
imaginary components, such that at the receiver of Bob they can be be constructively and
destructively combined with the original constellation points by Alice, respectively. For
Type-III symbols, the spoofing signals are designed to have independent real and imaginary
components. Under such a design, we formulate the average SSER minimization problem
by optimizing the spoofing power allocations over symbols, subject to the average transmit
power constraint. Though this problem is non-convex and generally difficult, we obtain its
optimal solution, motivated by that in the BPSK case.
• Numerical results show that for both BPSK and QPSK cases, the symbol-level spoofing
scheme with optimized transmission achieves a much better spoofing performance (in terms
of a lower average SSER), as compared to the block-level spoofing benchmark where the
spoofer does not exploit the symbol information of Alice, and a heuristically designed
symbol-level spoofing scheme.
It is worth noting that in the existing literature there is another type of higher-layer spoofing
attack, which can also be utilized for wireless communication intervention (see, e.g., [2], [15]–
[17]). For example, in the medium access control (MAC) spoofing [15] and Internet protocol
(IP) spoofing, a network attacker can hide its true identity and impersonate another user, so as to
access the targeted wireless networks. Nevertheless, for these higher-layer spoofing, the network
attacker needs to establish new wireless communication links to access the network. In contrast,
our proposed symbol-level spoofing is implemented at the physical layer, which can change the
communicated information of ongoing malicious wireless communications, thus leading to a
quicker response and intervention that is also more likely to be covert.
It is also worth comparing our proposed symbol-level spoofing versus the symbol-level pre-
coding (not for security) in downlink multiuser multi-antenna systems [18], [19]. In the symbol-
6level precoding, the transmitter designs its precoding vectors by exploiting the symbol-level
relationships among the messages to different receivers, such that the constructive part of the
inter-channel interference is preserved and exploited and only the destructive part is eliminated.
Although the symbol-level spoofing and precoding are based on a similar design principle
of exploiting the symbol-level relationship among co-channel signals, they focus on different
application scenarios for different purposes, thus requiring different design methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model
and formulates the average SSER minimization problem. Sections III and IV propose the symbol-
level spoofing approach and design the spoofing signals and their power allocations for the cases
of BPSK and QPSK modulations, respectively. Section V presents numerical results to evaluate
the performance of the proposed symbol-level spoofing design as compared to other benchmark
schemes. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a fundamental three-node system over AWGN channels, where
an intermediary legitimate spoofer aims to spoof a malicious wireless communication link from
Alice to Bob by changing the communicated data at the Bob side. We consider that the malicious
communication employs the BPSK or QPSK modulation techniques, which are most commonly
used in existing wireless communication systems. In the nth symbol of this block, we denote
the transmitted signal by Alice as
√
Pxn, where P is the transmit power per symbol at Alice,
and xn denotes the message that Alice wants to deliver to Bob. Here, xn is equally likely chosen
from the set of constellation points M, where M = {±1} and M = {(±1 ± j)/√2} for the
BPSK and QPSK cases, respectively. Therefore, we have |xn|2 = 1.
First, we introduce the receiver model of Bob by considering the case without spoofing.
Accordingly, the received signal by Bob in the nth symbol is expressed as
rn =
√
Pxn + vn, (1)
where vn denotes the noise at the receiver of Bob, which is an independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variable with zero
mean and unit variance. Based on the maximum likelihood (ML) detection, the decoded message
7by Bob is expressed as
argmin
s∈M
|rn −
√
Ps|2. (2)
Next, we consider the spoofing strategy employed by the spoofer. It is assumed that the
spoofer perfectly knows the transmitted symbol information xn’s of Alice. Here, xn’s can be
practically obtained by the spoofer via efficient eavesdropping or wiretapping beforehand. For
example, if Alice is an intermediary node of a multi-hop communication link, then the spoofer
can obtain xn’s via eavesdropping the previous hops; if Alice gets its transmitted data from
the backhaul or infrastructure-based networks, then the spoofer can acquire them via using
wiretapping devices to overhear the backhaul communications; and furthermore, the spoofer
can even secretly install an interceptor software (e.g., FlexiSPY3) in the Alice’s device to get
xn’s. Note that the assumption about the perfect symbol information at the spoofer has been
made in the existing correlated jamming literature (see, e.g., [12], [13]) to improve the jamming
performance. We make a similar assumption here for the purpose of characterizing the spoofing
performance upper bound, and leave the details about the symbol information acquisition for
future work. Based on the information of xn’s, the spoofer designs the spoofing signal as zn
in the nth symbol (the design details will be provided in the next section). Then, the received
signal at Bob is expressed as
yn =
√
Pxn + zn + vn. (3)
With the ML detection, the decoded message by Bob is expressed as
xˆn = argmin
s∈M
|yn −
√
Ps|2. (4)
The spoofer aims to maximize the opportunity of changing the messages of Alice to be the
desirable ones by itself. Let x¯n denote the desirable constellation point for the nth symbol,
which is equally likely chosen from M and is independent from the message xn sent by Alice.
Nevertheless, due to the limited spoofing power and receiver noise, it is difficult for the spoofer
to ensure that all symbols xˆn’s are successfully changed to be the desirable x¯n’s. In this case,
we define the probability of unsuccessful spoofing in any symbol n as the SSER, denoted
3See http://www.flexispy.com/.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of different types of symbols with the BPSK modulation, where the red triangle denotes the original
constellation point xn of Alice, and the blue circular denotes the desirable constellation point x¯n of the spoofer. (a) An example
of Type-I symbols, where xn and x¯n are identical with xn = x¯n = +1; (b) An example of Type-II symbols, where xn and x¯n
are opposite with xn = +1 and x¯n = −1.
by Pr(xˆn 6= x¯n).4 Then, the objective of the spoofer is to minimize the average SSER, i.e.,
En (Pr(xˆn 6= x¯n)), where En(·) denotes the statistical expectation over all possible symbols.
Suppose that the spoofer is constrained by a maximum average transmit power denoted by Q,
i.e., En(|zn|2) ≤ Q. As a result, the optimization problem of our interest is
min
{zn}
En (Pr(xˆn 6= x¯n))
s.t. En(|zn|2) ≤ Q. (5)
In the following two sections, we will solve problem (5) by considering the BPSP and QPSK
modulations, respectively.
III. OPTIMAL SYMBOL-LEVEL SPOOFING DESIGN WITH BPSK SIGNALING
In this section, we consider the case with BPSK signaling, i.e., M = {±1}. In the following,
we first propose the symbol-level spoofing signals design and then optimally solve the average
SSER minimization problem (5) in this case.
A. Spoofing Signals Design and Problem Reformulation
To facilitate the description, as shown in the examples in Fig. 2, we classify the symbols over
each block into two types as follows based on the relationship between the original constellation
4Note that with BPSK, the SSER is equivalent to the spoofing-bit-error-rate (SBER).
9point xn of Alice and the desirable one x¯n of the spoofer in each symbol n.
• Type-I symbol: The symbol n is called a Type-I symbol if xn and x¯n are identical (xn =
x¯n = +1 or xn = x¯n = −1). We denote the set of all Type-I symbols as N1.
• Type-II symbol: The symbol n is called a Type-II symbol if xn and x¯n are opposite (xn = +1
and x¯n = −1, or xn = −1 and x¯n = +1). We denote the set of all Type-II symbols as N2.
In the following two propositions, we present the optimal symbol-level spoofing signal design,
and obtain the corresponding SSER functions.
Proposition 3.1: Given any Type-I symbol n ∈ N1, it is optimal to minimize the conditional
SSER Pr(xˆn 6= x¯n|xn = x¯n) by designing zn =
√
Anxn aligning with xn, where An denotes the
spoofing power for this symbol. Accordingly, Pr(xˆn 6= x¯n|xn = x¯n) is given as
f1(An) =
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(√
An +
√
P
)
, (6)
where erf(·) is the error function defined as
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.2: Given any Type-II symbol n ∈ N2, it is optimal to minimize the conditional
SSER Pr(xˆn 6= x¯n|xn 6= x¯n) by designing zn = −
√
Bnxn opposite to xn, where Bn denotes the
spoofing power for this symbol. Accordingly, Pr(xˆn 6= x¯n|xn 6= x¯n) is given as
f2(Bn) =
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(√
Bn −
√
P
)
. (7)
Proof: This proposition can be proved by following a similar procedure as for Proposition
3.1. Therefore, the details are omitted for brevity.
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 are intuitive. In each Type-I symbol, Proposition 3.1 shows that
the spoofing signal should be designed such that at the receiver of Bob it is constructively
combined with the original signal from Alice, thus increasing the received power of the desirable
constellation point against Gaussian noise. In each Type-II symbol, Proposition 3.2 shows that
at the receiver of Bob the spoofing signal should be destructively combined with the original
signal from Alice, so as to move the constellation point towards the desirable opposite direction.
Based on these two propositions, the average SSER minimization problem (5) is specified
as follows by jointly optimizing the spoofing power An’s over Type-I symbols and Bn’s over
10
Type-II symbols.
min
{An≥0},{Bn≥0}
1
2
(En∈N1 (f1(An)) + En∈N2 (f2(Bn)))
s.t.
1
2
(En∈N1(An) + En∈N2(Bn)) ≤ Q, (8)
where the term 1/2 follows from the fact that each of the two symbol sets N1 and N2 on average
occupies a half of all symbols over each block.
The spoofing power allocation problem (8) is generally non-convex, since the SSER function
f2(Bn) in the objective is non-convex over Bn ≥ 0 (as will be shown next). Therefore, this
problem is difficult to solve. In the following, we first show some useful properties of the SSER
functions f1(An) and f2(Bn), and then present the optimal solution to problem (8).
B. Properties of the SSER Functions f1(An) and f2(Bn)
First, we have the following lemma for the SSER function f1(An).
Lemma 3.1: f1(An) is monotonically decreasing and convex over An ∈ [0,+∞).
Proof: It is easy to show that over An ∈ [0,+∞), the first- and second-order derivatives of
f1(An) satisfy that f ′1(An) ≤ 0 and f ′′1 (An) ≥ 0, respectively. Therefore, this lemma follows.
Next, we study the SSER function f2(Bn).
Lemma 3.2: f2(Bn) is monotonically decreasing over Bn ∈ [0,+∞). The convexity of f2(Bn)
is given as follows depending on Alice’s transmit power P .
• Alice’s low transmit power regime (i.e., P ≤ 2): f2(Bn) is convex over Bn ∈ [0,+∞).
• Alice’s high transmit power regime (i.e., P > 2): f2(Bn) is first convex over Bn ∈ [0, ζ1],
then concave over Bn ∈ (ζ1, ζ2), and finally convex over Bn ∈ [ζ2,+∞), where the two
boundary points ζ1 < ζ2 are given as
ζ1 =
(√
P −√P − 2
2
)2
, (9)
ζ2 =
(√
P +
√
P − 2
2
)2
. (10)
Proof: See Appendix B.
In the Alice’s high transmit power regime when P > 2, we further have the following property
for f2(Bn).
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Lemma 3.3: When P > 2, there exist two points τ1 and τ2 with 0 < τ1 ≤ ζ1 and τ2 ≥ ζ2,
such that all the points (Bn, f2(Bn)) are above the straight line passing through the two points
(τ1, f2(τ1)) and (τ2, f2(τ2)).
Proof: See Appendix C.
Note that the two points τ1 and τ2 can be found by using the iterative computation procedure in
Appendix C. Also note that τ1 should be strictly positive (though very small in general), since
for Type-II symbols and at the zero spoofing power, the marginal SSER with respect to the
spoofing power is negative infinity (f ′2(0) = −∞).
For the purpose of illustration, Fig. 3 shows an example of f2(Bn) with P = 10, which
validates the structural property of f2(Bn) in Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3. It is observed that for Type-
II symbols, when the spoofing power Bn is between τ1 and τ2, “time-sharing” between the
two spoofing powers τ1 and τ2 can achieve a lower SSER (or equivalently, a better spoofing
performance) than using the spoofing power Bn constantly.5 This is essential to help derive the
optimal power allocation solution to problem (8), as shown next.
Furthermore, Fig. 4 shows the values of ζ1, ζ2, τ1, and τ2 versus the transmit power P at
Alice. It is observed that as P increases, the values of ζ2 and τ2 increase while those of ζ1 and
τ1 decrease. When P > 3, the value of τ2 is observed to be larger than P , while τ1 is observed
to be close to zero (though strictly positive).
C. Optimal Spoofing Power Allocation for Problem (8)
Now, we present the optimal solution to problem (8) by using the properties of f1(An) and
f2(Bn) shown above. To help description, we define a new function f¯2(Bn): when P ≤ 2, we
define f¯2(Bn) to be equivalent to f2(Bn), i.e., f¯2(Bn) = f2(Bn); while when P > 2, we define
f¯2(Bn) =

 f2(Bn), if Bn ∈ [0, τ1] ∪ [τ2,+∞)cBn + d, if Bn ∈ (τ1, τ2), (11)
where c = f2(τ2)−f2(τ1)
τ2−τ1 and d = f2(τ2) − cτ2. Here, the points (Bn, cBn + d) correspond to
those on the straight line passing through the two points (τ1, f2(τ1)) and (τ2, f2(τ2)). Based on
Lemma 3.3, it is evident that f¯2(Bn) serves as a lower bound of f2(Bn) over Bn ∈ (τ1, τ2),
5By time-sharing, we mean that the spoofer uses the spoofing power τ1 for a γ portion of time, and τ2 for the remaining
1− γ portion of time, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is uniquely chosen such that γτ1 + (1− γ)τ2 = Bn for any given Bn > 0.
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Fig. 4. The values of ζ1, ζ2, τ1, and τ2 under different transmit power P at Alice.
and importantly, f¯2(Bn) is convex over Bn ∈ [0,+∞). Accordingly, we define an auxiliary
optimization problem
min
{A≥0},{B≥0}
1
2
(f1(A) + f¯2(B))
s.t. A+B ≤ 2Q, (12)
which is convex and whose optimal solution is denoted as A∗ and B∗. Here, since the strict
equality A∗+B∗ = 2Q should hold at the optimality of problem (12), A∗ and B∗ can be obtained
by using a simple bisection search. Note that both A∗ and B∗ should be strictly positive, which is
due to the fact that at the zero spoofing power, the marginal SSERs with respect to the spoofing
power are both negative infinity (f ′1(0) = −∞ and f ′2(0) = −∞).
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TABLE I
ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING PROBLEM (8)
1) If P > 2, then find the two points τ1 and τ2 by using the iterative computation procedure in Appendix C.
2) Construct the new function f¯2(Bn) as in (11), and obtain A∗ and B∗ by solving problem (12).
3) Obtain the optimal solution {A∗
n
} and {B∗
n
} to problem (8) by Proposition 3.3.
With the help of A∗ and B∗, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3: The optimal solution of {An} to problem (8) is given as A∗n = A∗, ∀n ∈ N1,
and that of {Bn} is given as follows by considering two cases.
• When P > 2 and B∗ ∈ (τ1, τ2), the spoofer uses time-sharing between the spoofing powers
τ1 and τ2, i.e., the spoofer sets B∗n = τ1 over a γ fraction of the symbols in N2, and B∗n = τ2
over the remaining 1 − γ fraction in N2, where 0 < γ < 1 is uniquely chosen such that
γτ1 + (1− γ)τ2 = B∗.
• Otherwise, it follows that B∗n = B∗, ∀n ∈ N2.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Therefore, problem (8) is finally solved, and we summarize the algorithm to optimally solve
it in Table I.
It is worth emphasizing that Proposition 3.3 shows the following interesting optimal spoofing
power allocation strategies for the spoofer to minimize the average SSER.
• When the transmit power at Alice is low (i.e., P ≤ 2) or the spoofing power at the spoofer
is high (such that B∗ > τ2), the spoofer should use the optimized constant transmit power
over both Type-I and Type-II symbols. This is due to the fact that both SSER functions
f1(An) and f2(Bn) are convex over such regimes.
• When the transmit power P at Alice is high (i.e., P > 2) and the spoofing power Q at the
spoofer is low6 (such that τ1 ≤ B∗ ≤ τ2), the spoofer focuses its spoofing power over only
a certain percentage of Type-II symbols with an “on-off” power control, i.e., the spoofer
uses a large spoofing power (i.e., τ2 > 0) over a 1 − γ portion of Type-II symbols, and
uses nearly zero spoofing power over the other Type-II symbols. This is due to the fact that
6Indeed, when the spoofing power is sufficiently low such that B∗ ≤ τ1, the spoofer should instead use constant spoofing
power over Type-II symbols. Nevertheless, since τ1 is also too small, this case does not happen under practical values of Q.
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Fig. 5. Illustration of different types of symbols with the QPSK modulation, where the red triangle denotes the original
constellation point xn of Alice, and the blue circular denotes the desirable constellation point x¯n of the spoofer. (a) An example
of Type-I symbols, where xn and x¯n are identical with xn = x¯n = (+1 + j)/
√
2; (b) An example of Type-II symbols, where
xn and x¯n are opposite with xn = (+1+ j)/
√
2 and x¯n = (−1− j)/
√
2; (c) An example of Type-III symbols, where xn and
x¯n are neighboring with xn = (+1 + j)/
√
2 and x¯n = (−1 + j)/
√
2.
the SSER function f2(Bn) is non-convex over the regime of Bn ∈ (τ1, τ2), and thus it is
beneficial for the spoofer to allocate almost all the power over a limited number of Type-II
symbols.
IV. SYMBOL-LEVEL SPOOFING DESIGN WITH QPSK SIGNALLING
In this section, we consider the case with QPSK signalling, i.e., M , {(±1 ± j)/√2}. We
first design the symbol-level spoofing signals and obtain the SSER functions under any given
spoofing power, and then solve the average SSER minimization problem (5) in this case.
A. Spoofing Signals Design and Problem Reformulation
Similar to the BPSK case and as illustrated in the example in Fig. 5, we classify the QPSK
symbols into three types based on the relationship between the original constellation point xn
of Alice and the desirable one x¯n of the spoofer.
• Type-I symbol: The symbol n is called a Type-I symbol if xn and x¯n are identical (i.e.,
xn = x¯n). The set of all Type-I symbols is denoted as N1.
• Type-II symbol: The symbol n is called a Type-II symbol if xn and x¯n are opposite (i.e.,
xn = −x¯n). The set of all Type-II symbols is denoted as N2.
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• Type-III symbol: The symbol n is called a Type-III symbol if xn and x¯n are neighboring.
The set of all Type-III symbols is denoted as N3.
Here, Type-I, Type-II, and Type-III symbols on average occupy 1/4, 1/4, and 1/2 portions
of all symbols, respectively. To facilitate the description, we focus on one particular original
constellation point xn = (1 + j)/
√
2, and consider the desirable constellation point to be x¯n =
(1 + j)/
√
2, x¯n = (−1 − j)/
√
2, and x¯n = (−1 + j)/
√
2, for Type-I, Type-II, and Type-III
symbols, respectively. Under each of the three desirable constellation points, we will design
the corresponding symbol-level spoofing signal and derive the SSER function under any given
spoofing power. Note that the spoofing signals design for other symbols (i.e., Type-I, Type-II,
and Type-III symbols other than those in Fig. 5) can be similarly devised to achieve the same
SSER functions, and thus is omitted for brevity.
First, consider a particular Type-I symbol n ∈ N1 with xn = x¯n = (1 + j)/
√
2. In this case,
the optimal spoofing signal is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1: It is optimal to minimize the conditional SSER Pr(xˆn 6= x¯n|xn = x¯n =
(1 + j)/
√
2) by designing zn =
√
An(1 + j)/
√
2), where An denotes the given spoofing power
for this Type-I symbol. Accordingly, Pr(xˆn 6= x¯n|xn = x¯n = (1 + j)/
√
2) is given as
g1(An) =1−
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(√
An/2 +
√
P/2
))2
. (13)
Proof: See Appendix E.
Next, consider a particular Type-II symbol n ∈ N2 with xn = (1 + j)/
√
2 and x¯n = (−1 −
j)/
√
2. In this case, it is difficult to rigorously derive the optimal spoofing signal design under
any values of P . Nevertheless, we can provide the optimal spoofing signal in the special case
of P ≤ 4 in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2: In the case of P ≤ 4, it is optimal to minimize the conditional SSER Pr(xˆn 6=
x¯n|xn = (1 + j)/
√
2, x¯n = (−1 − j)/
√
2) by designing zn =
√
Bn(−1 − j)/
√
2, where Bn
denotes the given spoofing power for this Type-II symbol. Accordingly, Pr(xˆn 6= x¯n|xn =
(1 + j)/
√
2, x¯n = (−1− j)/
√
2) is given as
g2(Bn) = 1−
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(√
Bn/2−
√
P/2
))2
. (14)
Proof: See Appendix F.
For the remaining case of P > 4, it is difficult to prove the optimality of the spoofing signal
design of zn =
√
Bn(−1 − j)/
√
2. Nevertheless, such optimality is observed via extensive
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simulations. Therefore, we choose zn =
√
Bn(−1 − j)/
√
2 for this particular Type-II symbol
under any value of P , and accordingly, we have the conditional SSER as g2(Bn) in (14).
Remark 4.1: From Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, it is observed that the optimally designed spoofing
signals for Type-I and Type-II symbols have an equal strength in their respective real and
imaginary components, such that at the receiver of Bob they are constructively and destructively
combined with the original signals of Alice, respectively. The design of spoofing signals in Type-
I and Type-II symbols in the QPSK case is similar to that in the BPSK case (see Propositions
3.1 and 3.2), but leading to different SSER functions due to their difference in the modulation
order.
In addition, consider a particular Type-III symbol n ∈ N3 with xn = (1 + j)/
√
2 and x¯n =
(−1 + j)/√2. In this case, we independently design the real and imaginary components of the
spoofing signal, and generally set it to be zn = −
√
CRn + j
√
CIn, where the spoofing power is
denoted as CRn + CIn. Under such a design, the conditional SSER is expressed as
g3(C
R
n , C
I
n) =1−
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(√
CRn −
√
P/2
))(1
2
+
1
2
erf
(√
CIn +
√
P/2
))
. (15)
Here, the derivation of (15) is based on a similar procedure as in the proof of Propositions 4.1
(see (27)), and thus is omitted for brevity.
By combining the above three types of symbols, the average SSER minimization problem is
reformulated as a spoofing power allocation problem among the three types of symbols, given
as
min
{An≥0},{Bn≥0},{CRn≥0,CIn≥0}
1
4
En∈N1(g1(An)) +
1
4
En∈N2(g2(Bn)) +
1
2
En∈N3(g3(C
R
n , C
I
n))
s.t.
1
4
En∈N1(An) +
1
4
En∈N2(Bn) +
1
2
En∈N3(C
R
n + C
I
n) ≤ Q. (16)
Problem (16) is nonconvex in general and thus difficult to solve. In the following, we show some
useful properties of the three SSER functions, to help solve problem (16).
B. Properties of the SSER Functions g1(An), g2(Bn), and g3(CRn , CIn)
In this subsection, we show the monotonic properties and convexities of the three SSER
functions.
Lemma 4.1: g1(An) is monotonically decreasing and convex over An ∈ [0,+∞).
Proof: See Appendix G.
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For g2(Bn), it is very difficult for us to rigorously prove its convexity over the whole regime
of Bn ∈ [0,+∞]. We first provide the following lemma to analytically show its convexity under
certain regimes, and then remark on its convexity in the general case.
Lemma 4.2: g2(Bn) is monotonically decreasing over Bn ∈ [0,+∞). The convexity of g2(Bn)
is given as follows.
• Under any value of P , there exists a small but positive χ1, such that g2(Bn) is convex over
Bn ∈ [0, χ1], where χ1 < ζ1 with ζ1 given in (9);
• Under any value of P , g2(Bn) is convex over Bn ∈ [χ2,+∞), where χ2 is given as follows
and χ2 > ζ2 with ζ2 given in (10);
χ2 = max

P,


√
P +
√
pi
2
+
√(√
P +
√
pi
2
)2
− 2
2


2

 ; (17)
• When P > 2, g2(Bn) is concave over Bn ∈ [ζ1, ζ2].
Proof: See Appendix H.
Remark 4.2: Note that in Lemma 4.2, we cannot analytically show the convexity of g2(Bn) in
the regime of Bn ∈ (ζ1, χ1)∪(ζ2, χ2), and thus in the whole regime of Bn ∈ [0,+∞). Despite this
fact, via extensive simulations, we numerically find that g2(Bn) has a similar convexity property
as f2(Bn) in Proposition 3.2. That is, under Alice’s low transmit power regime (particularly,
when P is no larger than a boundary point ξ ≈ 1.146), g2(Bn) is convex over Bn ∈ [0,+∞);
whereas under Alice’s high transmit power regime (when P > ξ ≈ 1.146), there exist two points
0 ≤ ζ¯1 ≤ ζ¯2 such that g2(Bn) is first convex over [0, ζ¯1], then concave over (ζ¯1, ζ¯2), and finally
convex over [ζ¯2,+∞). In the latter case, it follows similar to Lemma 3.3 that there exist two
points τ¯1 and τ¯2 with 0 < τ¯1 ≤ ζ¯1 and τ¯2 ≥ ζ¯2, such that all the points (Bn, g2(Bn)) are above
the straight line passing through the two points (τ¯1, g2(τ¯1)) and (τ¯2, g2(τ¯2)). Note that under any
given value of P , the values of ζ¯1 and ζ¯2 can be numerically found by checking the second-order
derivatives of g2(Bn); and baed on them we can obtain τ¯1 and τ¯2 by using a similar procedure
as that in Appendix C.
Next, we consider the SSER function g3(CRn , CIn) for the Type-III symbols. We rewrite g3(CRn , CIn) =
1 − gR3 (CRn )gI3(CIn) with gR3 (CRn ) = 12 + 12erf
(√
CRn −
√
P/2
)
and gI3(CIn) = 12 +
1
2
erf
(√
CIn +√
P/2
)
. Then we have the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.3: gI3(CIn) is monotonically increasing and concave over CIn ∈ [0,+∞). gR3 (CRn )
is monotonically increasing over CRn ∈ [0,+∞). The convexity of gR3 (CRn ) is given as follows
depending on Alice’s transmit power P .
• Alice’s low transmit power regime (i.e., P ≤ 4): gR3 (CRn ) is concave over Bn ∈ [0,+∞).
• Alice’s high transmit power regime (i.e., P > 4): gR3 (CRn ) is first concave over Bn ∈ [0, ζˆ1],
then convex over Bn ∈ (ζˆ1, ζˆ2), and finally concave over Bn ∈ [ζˆ2,+∞), where the two
boundary points ζˆ1 < ζˆ2 are given as ζˆ1 =
(√
P/2−
√
P/2−2
2
)2
and ζˆ2 =
(√
P/2+
√
P/2−2
2
)2
.
Furthermore, there exist two points τˆ1 and τˆ2 with 0 < τˆ1 ≤ ζˆ1 and τˆ2 ≥ ζˆ2, such that all
the points gR3 (CRn )’s are below the straight line passing through the two points (τˆ1, gR3 (τˆ1))
and (τˆ2, gR3 (τˆ2)).
Proof: This lemma can be proved following similar procedures as those for Lemmas 3.1
and 3.2. Therefore, the details are omitted for brevity.
The results in Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 will play important roles in the design of the spoofing
power allocation to solve problem (16), as will be shown next.
C. Spoofing Power Allocation for Problem (16)
In this subsection, we propose the optimal solution to problem (16) by using the properties
of the SSER functions shown in the proceeding subsection. First, we define two auxiliary SSER
functions for Type-II and Type-III symbols to facilitate the derivation. For Type-II symbols,
we define an auxiliary SSER function g¯2(Bn), where if P ≤ ξ ≈ 1.146, we have g¯2(Bn) =
g2(Bn), ∀Bn ∈ [0,+∞); whereas if P > ξ ≈ 1.146, it follows that
g¯2(Bn) =

 g2(Bn), if Bn ∈ [0, τ¯1] ∪ [τ¯2,+∞)c¯Bn + d¯, if Bn ∈ (τ¯1, τ¯2), (18)
where c¯ = (g2(τ¯2) − g2(τ¯1))/(τ¯2 − τ¯1) and d¯ = g2(τ¯2) − c¯τ¯2. Here, the points (Bn, c¯Bn +
d¯) correspond to those on the straight line passing through the two points (τ¯1, g2(τ¯1)) and
(τ¯2, g2(τ¯2)). Based on Lemma 3.3, it is evident that g¯2(Bn) serves as a lower bound of g2(Bn)
over Bn ∈ (τ¯1, τ¯2), and importantly, g¯2(Bn) is convex over Bn ∈ [0,+∞).
In addition, we consider Type-III symbols, and define another auxiliary function
g¯3(C
R
n , C
I
n) = 1− g¯R3 (CRn )gI3(CIn), (19)
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where if P ≤ 4, we have g¯R3 (CRn ) = gR3 (CRn ); whereas if P > 4, it follows that
g¯R3 (C
R
n ) =

 g
R
3 (C
R
n ), if C
R
n ∈ [0, τˆ1] ∪ [τˆ2,+∞)
cˆCRn + dˆ, if C
R
n ∈ (τˆ1, τˆ2),
(20)
with cˆ = g
R
3
(τˆ2)−gR3 (τˆ1)
τˆ2−τˆ1 and dˆ = g2(τˆ2)−cˆτˆ2. Here, the points (CRn , cˆCRn +dˆ) correspond to those on
the straight line passing through the two points (τˆ1, g3R(τˆ1)) and (τˆ2, g3R(τˆ2)). Based on Lemma
4.3, it is evident that g¯R3 (CRn ) serves as an upper bound of gR3 (CRn ) over CRn ∈ (τˆ1, τˆ2), and
accordingly, g¯3(CRn , CIn) serves as a lower bound of g3(CRn , CIn) over CRn ∈ (τˆ1, τˆ2). Furthermore,
g¯3(C
R
n ) is concave over CRn ∈ [0,+∞).
By combining the above discussions for the three types of symbols, we solve problem (16)
by solving the following auxiliary problem:
min
A≥0,B≥0,CR≥0,CI≥0
1
4
g¯1(A) +
1
4
g¯2(B) +
1
2
(
1− g¯R3 (CR)gI3(CI)
)
s.t.
1
4
A+
1
4
B +
1
2
(CR + CI) ≤ Q. (21)
Note that problem (21) itself is non-convex due to the coupling of g¯R3 (CR) and gI3(CI).
Nevertheless, under any given CR ≥ 0, the optimization over A, B, and CI becomes a convex
optimization problem. As a result, we use a one-dimensional search over CR ∈ [0, 2Q], and
solve the convex optimization problem in (21) under any given CR to obtain the optimal A,
B, and CI. Therefore, problem (21) is optimally solved, for which the corresponding spoofing
power allocation solution is denoted as A∗∗, B∗∗, CR∗∗, and CI∗∗, respectively. Then we obtain
the optimal spoofing signals design for problem (16) as given in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3: The spoofing power allocation solution of {An} and {CIn} to problem (16)
is given as A∗∗n = A∗∗, ∀n ∈ N1, and CI∗∗n = CI∗∗, ∀n ∈ N3, and that of {Bn} and {CRn } is
given as follows.
• When P > ξ ≈ 1.146 and B∗∗ ∈ (τ¯1, τ¯2), the spoofer uses time-sharing between the spoofing
power τ¯1 and τ¯2, i.e., the spoofer sets B∗n = τ¯1 over a γ¯ fraction of the symbols in N2, and
B∗n = τ¯2 over the remaining 1− γ¯ fraction in N2, where 0 < γ¯ < 1 is uniquely chosen such
that γ¯τ¯1 + (1− γ¯)τ¯2 = B∗∗; otherwise, it follows that B∗∗n = B∗∗, ∀n ∈ N2.
• When P > 4 and CR∗∗ ∈ (τˆ1, τˆ2), the spoofer uses time-sharing between the spoofing
power τˆ1 and τˆ2, i.e., the spoofer sets CR∗∗n = τˆ1 over a γˆ fraction of the symbols in N2,
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TABLE II
ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING PROBLEM (16)
1) If P > ξ ≈ 1.146, then find the two points τ¯1 and τ¯2, and construct the new function g¯2(Bn) as in (18).
2) If P > 4, then find the two points τˆ1 and τˆ2, and construct the new function g¯R3 (CRn ) as in (20).
3) Obtain the optimal solution to problem (21) to be A∗∗, B∗∗, CR∗∗, and CI∗∗.
4) Obtain the optimal solution {A∗∗
n
}, {B∗∗
n
}, {CR∗∗
n
}, and {CI∗∗
n
} to problem (16) by Proposition 4.3.
and CR∗∗n = τˆ2 over the remaining 1 − γˆ fraction in N2, where 0 < γˆ < 1 is uniquely
chosen such that γˆτˆ1+(1− γˆ)τˆ2 = CR∗∗; otherwise, it follows that CR∗∗n = CR∗∗, ∀n ∈ N3.
Proof: This proposition can be proved following similar procedures as that for Proposition
3.3. Therefore, the details are omitted for brevity.
Therefore, problem (16) is finally solved, and we summarize the algorithm to solve it in Table
II.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to show the performance of our proposed symbol-
level spoofing with optimized power allocation, as compared with two benchmark schemes in
the following.
• Block-level spoofing: In this scheme, the spoofer is assumed to be not aware of the original
symbol information xn from Alice. In this scheme, the spoofer uses the constant transmit
power Q over all symbols7 and sets the spoofing signal to be the exact desirable constellation
point x¯n, i.e., zn =
√
Qx¯n.
• Heuristic symbol-level spoofing: In this scheme, the spoofer designs its spoofing signals by
only heuristically exploiting the symbol-level relationship between the original constellation
points of Alice and the desirable one of the spoofer, but without the sophisticated transmit
optimization as in our proposed optimal symbol-level spoofing. In particular, for Type-I
symbols, the spoofer does not allocate any spoofing power to them, since the original and
desirable constellation points are already identical; for other symbols (i.e., Type-II symbols
7Due to the non-convexity of the SSER function, it is possible to further improve the average SSER performance of the block-
level spoofing by allowing adaptive power allocation over symbols (e.g., time-sharing of various spoofing powers). Nevertheless,
how to optimize the adaptive power allocation is a non-trivial problem, which is left for our future work.
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for the BPSK case, as well as Type-II and Type-III symbols for the QPSK case), the spoofer
equally allocates its spoofing power to each of them. As a result, in the BPSK case, the
spoofing powers allocated for each Type-I and Type-II symbols are 0 and 2Q, respectively,
and the resultant average SSER is given as 1
2
f1(0) +
1
2
f2(2Q). In the QPSK case, the
spoofing powers allocated for each Type-I, Type-II, and Type-III symbols are 0, 4Q/3, and
4Q/3, respectively, and the resultant average SSER is given to be 1
4
g1(0) +
1
4
g2(4Q/3) +
1
2
g3(4Q/3, 0). Here, the average SSER 12g3(4Q/3, 0) for Type-III symbols is obtained by
considering the symbols with xn = (1 + j)/
√
2 and x¯n = (−1 + j)/
√
2, and allocating the
spoofing power to the real components only (as the imaginary components of the original
and desirable constellation points are already identical).
First, consider the BPSK case, and Fig. 6 shows the optimal spoofing power allocation versus
the average spoofing power Q, where the transmit power at Alice is set as P = 10. It is observed
that when Q is small (i.e., Q ≤ 13 dB), almost all the spoofing power is reserved for Type-II
symbols to move the constellation points efficiently towards the desirable opposite directions;
whereas when Q becomes large (i.e., Q > 13 dB), the spoofing power is allocated more fairly
between Type-I and Type-II symbols. Particularly, in the small Q regime when Q < 8.366 dB,
it is observed that an “on-off” time-sharing strategy between the spoofing power τ1 ≈ 0 and
τ2 = 13.726 should be employed over Type-II symbols. In other words, in this regime, the
spoofer should focus its spoofing power on a certain portion of Type-II symbols.
Fig. 7 shows the average SSER performance of the three schemes versus the spoofing power
Q in the BPSK case, where the transmit power at Alice is set as P = 10. It is observed that the
optimal symbol-level spoofing achieves a better performance (or equivalently, a lower average
SSER) than the block-level spoofing benchmark. In particular, over 3 dB performance gain is
obtained by the symbol-level spoofing when the average spoofing power Q becomes large. It is
also observed that the optimal symbol-level spoofing leads to a lower average SSER than the
heuristic symbol-level spoofing when Q < 8.366 dB and Q > 13 dB, and the two schemes have
a similar average SSER performance when the value of Q is between 8.366 dB and 13 dB. The
results can be explained based on the optimal spoofing power allocation shown in Fig. 6. When
Q < 8.366 dB, the optimal symbol-level spoofing employs an “on-off” transmission strategy
with time-sharing between the spoofing power τ1 ≈ 0 and τ2 = 13.726, thus outperforming the
heuristic one that uses fixed spoofing power over all Type-II symbols. When Q > 13 dB, the
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Fig. 6. The optimal spoofing power allocation versus the average spoofing power Q, where the transmit power at Alice is set
as P = 10.
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Fig. 7. The average SSER performance in the BPSK case, where the transmit power at Alice is set as P = 10.
optimal symbol-level spoofing allocates the spoofing power more fairly between Type-I and Type-
II symbols, thus reducing the average SSER as compared to the heuristic one that only allocates
the spoofing power to Type-II symbols. These results show the significance of our proposed
optimal spoofing power allocation. In addition, it is observed that the heuristic symbol-level
spoofing performs worse than the block-level spoofing when Q becomes large, which is due
to the fact that the heuristic symbol-level spoofing does not allocate any spoofing power to the
Type-I symbols, which leads to the average SSER floor.
Next, consider the QPSK case. Fig. 8 shows the average SSER achieved by the three schemes
versus the average spoofing power Q, where the transmit power at Alice is set as P = 10.
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Fig. 8. The average SSER performance in the QPSK case, where the transmit power at Alice is set as P = 10.
Similar to the BPSK case as in Fig. 7, the optimal symbol-level spoofing is observed to achieve
significantly lower SSER than the block-level spoofing, and over 5 dB average SSER reduction
is obtained when Q becomes large. Furthermore, the optimal symbol-level spoofing achieves
lower average SSER than the heuristic symbol-level spoofing under any value of Q. Based on
these observations, it follows that the optimal spoofing power allocation is more important with
higher-order modulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed spoofing attacks in the physical layer for the legitimate intervention of
malicious wireless communications. We proposed a new symbol-level spoofing approach for a
legitimate spoofer to change the messages transmitted in a malicious link. With knowledge of the
original constellation points by Alice, the spoofer exploits the correlations between its desirable
constellation points and the original ones by Alice to improve the spoofing performance. In
particular, we developed optimal spoofing signals design and power allocation in the cases of
BPSK and QPSK modulations. How to extend the symbol-level spoofing into general modulation
techniques (such as M-PSK and M-QAM modulations with M > 4) and practical cases with
fading channels and imperfect/partial transmitted message knowledge are interesting problems
worth pursuing in the future.
24
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 3.1
Consider a typical Type-I symbol n ∈ N1 with xn = x¯n. In this case, the SSER Pr(xˆn 6=
x¯n|xn = x¯n) is expressed as
Pr(xˆn 6= x¯n|xn = x¯n) = Pr(xˆn 6= xn)
=Pr(|yn −
√
Pxn|2 > |yn +
√
Pxn|2) (22)
=Pr(|zn + vn|2 > |2
√
Pxn + zn + vn|2), (23)
where (22) follows from [20, Chapter 5] based on the ML detection in (4), and (23) holds from
(3). In this case, to minimize the SSER in (23), we should set the phase of zn to be same as
that of xn, and accordingly we have zn =
√
Anxn. In this case, note that the term in (23) is
only dependent on the real part of the CSCG random variable vn, which is a real Gaussian
random variable denoted by v¯n with zero mean and variance 1/2. Therefore, we further express
the function Pr(xˆn 6= x¯n|xn = x¯n) as
f1(An) =Pr(|
√
Anxn + v¯n|2 > |2
√
Pxn +
√
Anxn + v¯n|2)
=Pr
(
v¯n/xn >
√
An +
√
P
)
=
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(√
An +
√
P
)
, (24)
where (24) holds due to the fact that v¯n/xn is also a real Gaussian random variable with zero
mean and variance 1/2. Therefore, this proposition is proved.
B. Proof of Lemma 3.2
First, the first-order derivative of f2(Bn) is given as
f ′2(Bn) = −
1
2
√
pi
e−(
√
Bn−
√
P)
2
B
− 1
2
n ≤ 0.
Therefore, f2(Bn) is monotonically decreasing over Bn ∈ [0,+∞).
Next, we have the second-order derivative of f2(Bn) as
f ′′2 (Bn) =
B
− 3
2
n
4
√
pi
e−(
√
Bn−
√
P)
2
(
2Bn − 2
√
PBn + 1
)
,
based on which we consider the following two cases when P ≤ 2 and P > 2, respectively.
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• In the Alice’s low transmit power regime (i.e., P ≤ 2), it can be shown that f ′′2 (Bn) ≥ 0
always holds, and therefore, f2(Bn) is convex over Bn ∈ [0,+∞).
• In the Alice’s high transmit power regime (i.e., P > 2), the equation f ′′2 (Bn) = 0 (equiva-
lently, 2Bn−2
√
PBn+1 = 0) has two solutions given as ζ1 and ζ2 in (9) and (10), respec-
tively. It is evident that f ′′2 (Bn) ≥ 0 when Bn ∈ [0, ζ1] and Bn ∈ [ζ2,+∞), and f ′′2 (Bn) < 0
when Bn ∈ (ζ1, ζ2). Therefore, it follows that f2(Bn) is convex over Bn ∈ [0, ζ1], concave
over Bn ∈ (ζ1, ζ2), and convex over Bn ∈ [ζ2,+∞).
As a result, this lemma is proved.
C. Proof of Lemma 3.3
We prove this lemma via two steps. First, we find two points (τ1, f2(τ1)) and (τ2, f2(τ2)) with
0 < τ1 ≤ ζ1 and τ2 ≥ ζ2, which satisfy f ′2(τ1) = f ′2(τ2) = θ(τ1, τ2). Here, θ(τ1, τ2) , f2(τ2)−f2(τ1)τ2−τ1
denotes the slope of the straight line passing through (τ1, f2(τ1)) and (τ2, f2(τ2)). Then, we show
that all the points (Bn, f2(Bn)) are above the straight line passing through such two points.
First, we find such two points (τ1, f2(τ1)) and (τ2, f2(τ2)) with f ′2(τ1) = f ′2(τ2) = θ(τ1, τ2)
via the following procedure. To start with, we set τˆ1 = ζ1 and τˆ2 = ζ2. Since f2(Bn) is concave
over Bn ∈ [ζ1, ζ2], it is evident that f ′2(τˆ1) ≥ θ(τˆ1, τˆ2) ≥ f ′2(τˆ2), i.e., the slope of the line passing
through (ζ1, f2(ζ1)) and (ζ2, f2(ζ2)) is between the values of f ′2(ζ1) and f ′2(ζ2). Then, we proceed
as follows.
• In the first step, we decrease the value of τˆ1 to find a new τˆ1 > 0 such that f ′2(τˆ1) = θ(τˆ1, τˆ2).
Note that f2(Bn) is convex over Bn ∈ [0, ζ1], and thus decreasing τˆ1 leads to the decrease
of f ′2(τˆ1) and the increase of θ(τˆ1, τˆ2). Based on this fact together with f ′2(0) = −∞,
such a point τˆ1 can be obtained via bisection. For this newly found τˆ1, it follows that
f ′2(τˆ1) = θ(τˆ1, τˆ2) ≥ f ′2(τˆ2).
• In the second step, we increase the value of τˆ2 to find a new τˆ2 > 0 such that θ(τˆ1, τˆ2) =
f ′2(τˆ2). Note that f2(Bn) is convex over Bn ∈ [ζ2,+∞), and thus increasing τˆ2 leads
to the increase of f ′2(τˆ2) and the decrease of θ(τˆ1, τˆ2). Based on this fact together with
f ′2(+∞) = 0, such a point τˆ2 can be obtained via bisection. For this newly found τˆ2, it
follows that f ′2(τˆ1) ≥ θ(τˆ1, τˆ2) = f ′2(τˆ2).
• By iteratively implementing the above two steps, f ′2(ζ1) is strictly increased and f ′2(ζ2)
is strictly decreased, while θ(τˆ1, τˆ2) is always between them. Note that f2(Bn) is contin-
26
uous and second-order differentiable. By using this fact together with f ′2(0) = −∞ and
f ′2(+∞) = 0, it is evident that there exist two finite extreme points τ1 and τ2, such that
f ′2(τ1) = θ(τ1, τ2) = f
′
2(τ2).
Next, we prove that all the points (Bn, f2(Bn)) are above the line passing through (τ1, f2(τ1))
and (τ2, f2(τ2)). First, consider the regimes with Bn ∈ [0, ζ1] and Bn ∈ [ζ2,+∞). Since the
function f2(Bn) is convex over this regime, and θ(τ1, τ2) = f ′2(τ1) = f ′2(τ2), it is evident that
over such two regimes, the points (Bn, f2(Bn)) are above the line passing through (τ1, f2(τ1))
and (τ2, f2(τ2)). Then, consider the regime with Bn ∈ [ζ1, ζ2]. Since f2(Bn) is concave over this
regime, the points (Bn, f2(Bn)) are above the line passing through (ζ1, f2(ζ1)) and (ζ2, f2(ζ2)),
and thus are also above that passing through (τ1, f2(τ1)) and (τ2, f2(τ2)).
By combining the above two steps, this lemma is proved.
D. Proof of Proposition 3.3
To start with, we define another auxiliary problem
min
{An≥0},{Bn≥0}
1
2
(
En∈N1 (f1(An)) + En∈N2
(
f¯2(Bn)
))
s.t.
1
2
(En∈N1(An) + En∈N2(Bn)) ≤ Q, (25)
which is obtained based on problem (8) by replacing f2(Bn) as f¯2(Bn). It is evident that the
optimal value of problem (25) is a lower bound on that of problem (8). Therefore, if the objective
value of problem (8) achieved by the solution in this proposition is same as the optimal value of
problem (25), then such a solution is optimal for problem (8). We prove this proposition based
on this observation.
First, we show that the optimal solution to problem (25) is given as A∗n = A∗, ∀n ∈ N1 and
B∗n = B
∗, ∀n ∈ N2. Note that both f1(An) and f2(Bn) are convex, and therefore, there exists an
optimal power allocation solution in which the spoofing power An’s and Bn’s remain constant
over n ∈ N1 and n ∈ N2, respectively. Therefore, we can express An = A, ∀n ∈ N1 and
Bn = B, ∀n ∈ N2. Accordingly, problem (25) is degenerated to be problem (12). As a result,
the optimal solution to problem (25) is A∗n = A∗, ∀n ∈ N1 and B∗n = B∗, ∀n ∈ N2.
Next, based on (11) and Lemma 3.3, it is easy to verify that the objective value of problem
(8) achieved by the solution in this proposition is same as the optimal value of problem (25)
achieved by A∗n = A∗, ∀n ∈ N1 and B∗n = B∗, ∀n ∈ N2. Therefore, this proposition is proved.
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E. Proof of Proposition 4.1
Consider one particular Type-I symbol with xn = x¯n = 1+j√2 . Let the real and imaginary
components of the spoofing signal zn be denoted as zRn and zIn, and those of yn as yRn and
yIn, respectively. Then yRn and yIn are two real Gaussian random variables with mean values of√
P/2+ zRn and
√
P/2+ zIn, respectively, as well as variance of 1/2. As a result, the joint PDF
of yRn and yIn is given as
p(yRn , y
I
n) =
1√
pi
e−(y
R
n
−
√
P/2−zR
n
)2e−(y
I
n
−
√
P/2−zI
n
)2 . (26)
Note that the spoofing is successful when the phase of yn lies between 0 and pi/2 (within the
detection regime), i.e., the real and imaginary components of yn are both positive. Therefore,
the conditional SSER under given zRn and zIn is given as
1−
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
0
p(yRn , y
I
n)dy
R
ndy
I
n
=1−
∫ +∞
−
√
P/2−zR
n
∫ +∞
−
√
P/2−zI
n
1
pi
e−y
R
n
2
e−y
I
n
2
dyRndy
I
n
=1−
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
zRn +
√
P/2
))(1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
zIn +
√
P/2
))
. (27)
To minimize the above conditional SSER under the given transmit power An, i.e., zRn
2
+zIn
2
= An,
it is desirable to set zRn ≥ 0 and zIn ≥ 0. As a result, obtaining zRn and zIn is equivalent to solving
the following problem:
max
zR
n
≥0,zI
n
≥0
ln
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
zRn +
√
P/2
))
+ ln
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
zIn +
√
P/2
))
s.t. zRn
2
+ zIn
2
= An. (28)
Note that the function ln
(
1
2
+ 1
2
erf
(√
z +
√
P/2
))
is concave over z ≥ 0. Therefore, by
substituting zˆRn = zRn
2
and zˆIn = zIn
2 into problem (28), we can show that the optimality is
obtained as zˆRn = zˆIn = An/2. Therefore, the optimality of the problem (28) is achieved when
zRn = z
I
n =
√
An/2. By using this together with (27), the conditional SSER in (13) is obtained.
Therefore, this proposition is proved.
F. Proof of Proposition 4.2
Similar to the proof of Proposition 4.1, the joint PDF of yRn and yIn is given in (26). Note
that the spoofing is successful when the phase of yn lies between pi and 3pi/2, i.e., the real
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and imaginary components of yn are both negative. As a result, the conditional SSER Pr(xˆn 6=
x¯n|xn = x¯n = (1 + j)/
√
2) is given as
1−
∫ 0
−∞
∫ 0
−∞
p(yRn , y
I
n)dy
R
ndy
I
n
=1−
(
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(
zRn +
√
P/2
))(1
2
− 1
2
erf
(
zIn +
√
P/2
))
. (29)
To minimize the above conditional SSER under the given spoofing power Bn, i.e., zRn
2
+zIn
2
= Bn,
it is desirable to set zRn ≤ 0 and zIn ≤ 0. As a result, obtaining zRn and zIn is equivalent to solving
the following problem:
max
zR
n
≤0,zI
n
≤0
ln
(
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(
zRn +
√
P/2
))
+ ln
(
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(
zIn +
√
P/2
))
s.t. zRn
2
+ zIn
2
= Bn. (30)
By replacing zRn and zRn as −
√
zˆRn and −
√
zˆIn, problem (30) is recast as
max
zˆR
n
≥0,zˆR
n
≥0
ln
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(√
zˆRn −
√
P/2
))
+ ln
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(√
zˆIn −
√
P/2
))
s.t. zˆRn + zˆ
I
n = Bn. (31)
Note that when P ≤ 4, ln
(
1
2
+ 1
2
erf
(√
z −√P/2)) is concave, and therefore, the optimality
of problem (31) is obtained as zˆRn = zˆIn = Bn/2. As a result, the optimality of problem (30) is
achieved when zRn = zIn = −
√
Bn/2. By using this together with (29), the conditional SSER in
(14) is obtained. Therefore, this proposition is proved.
G. Proof of Lemma 4.1
It is evident that g1(An) is monotonically decreasing over An ≥ 0. Therefore, we only need
to show its convexity. The second-order derivative of g1(An) is given as
g′′1(An) =A
−1
n e
−
(√
An/2+
√
P/2
)2
·
(
− 1
4pi
e
−
(√
An/2+
√
P/2
)2
+
1
4
√
2pi
(1 + erf(
√
An/2 +
√
P/2))
(
A1/2n +
√
P + A−1/2n
))
. (32)
With An ≥ 0, it follows that
1
4
√
2pi
(1 + erf(
√
An/2 +
√
P/2))
(
A1/2n +
√
P + A−1/2n
)
>
1
4
√
2pi
A−1/2n >
1
4pi
A−1/2n , (33)
1
4pi
e
−
(√
An/2+
√
P/2
)
2
≤ 1
4pi
e−An/2. (34)
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Note that An < eAn for all An > 0, and therefore, 14pie
−An/2 < 1
4pi
A
−1/2
n . By using this
together with (33) and (34), it follows that − 1
4pi
e
−
(√
An/2+
√
P/2
)
2
+ 1
4
√
2pi
(1 + erf(
√
An/2 +√
P/2))
(
A
1/2
n +
√
P + A
−1/2
n
)
> 0. Accordingly, g′′1(An) > 0 for all An > 0. As a result,
g1(An) is a convex function, and this lemma is proved.
H. Proof of Proposition 4.2
It is easy to see that g2(Bn) is monotonically decreasing over Bn ∈ [0,+∞). It thus remains
to show its convexity. The second-order derivative of g2(Bn) is given as
g′′2(Bn) = B
−1
n e
−
(√
Bn/2−
√
P/2
)
2
·
(
− 1
4pi
e
−
(√
Bn/2−
√
P/2
)
2
+
1
4
√
2pi
(1 + erf(
√
Bn/2−
√
P/2))
(
B1/2n −
√
P +B−1/2n
))
. (35)
First, it is easy to see that g′′2(Bn) → +∞ as Bn → 0, and g′′2(ζ1) < 0. Since g2(Bn) is a
continuous function, there always exists a positive χ1 with χ1 < ζ1, such that over Bn ∈ [0, χ1]
we have g′′2(Bn) ≥ 0, i.e., g2(Bn) is convex.
Next, note that when Bn ≥ P , it follows that 1+erf(
√
Bn/2−
√
P/2) ≥ 1. Also, when Bn ≥
√P+√pi2+
√
(
√
P+
√
pi
2
)
2−2
2


2
, we have 1
4
√
2pi
(
B
1/2
n −
√
P +B
−1/2
n
)
≥ 1
4pi
. By combining the
above two facts, when Bn ≥ χ2, it holds that 14√2pi (1+erf(
√
Bn/2−
√
P/2))
(
B
1/2
n −
√
P +B
−1/2
n
)
≥
1
4pi
≥ 1
4pi
e
−
(√
Bn/2−
√
P/2
)2
. Accordingly, g′′2(Bn) ≥ 0 and g2(Bn) is convex.
Furthermore, when P > 2, it is easy to show that B1/2n −
√
P +B
−1/2
n ≤ 0 for Bn ∈ [ζ1, ζ2].
Therefore, in this case g′′2(Bn) ≤ 0 and g2(Bn) is concave.
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